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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE V. RAY:
THE DISTORTED APPLICATION OF
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT'S
PRIVACY EXEMPTION TO
REPATRIATED HAITIAN MIGRANTS
Jeffrey D. Zimmerman**
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, thousands of Haitians have fled their homeland
by boat to seek refuge in the United States.' In 1981, United States
President Ronald Reagan responded to the flow of Haitian migrants by
creating an interdiction program directing the Coast Guard to intercept
vessels carrying undocumented aliens and return the aliens to their point
of origin.' The Haitian Government formally agreed to the interdiction
program, which included a promise by Haiti not to prosecute returnees
United States State Department personnel, seeking to monitor Haiti's
compliance with the interdiction agreement, interviewed a number of
* 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
** J.D. Candidate 1995, Washington College of Law, The American University; B.A.
1989, Oberlin College.
1. LAWYERS COMMrrrEE FOR HmiAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOULEMENrT THE
FORCED RETURN OF HArITANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAITIAN INTERDICTION AGREF2,mENT
49 (1990) [hereinafter REFUGEE REFOULEmENT]. Prior to 1972, most Haitians who left
their homeland went to the Bahamas. Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of Haitian Mi-
grants on the High Seas: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 151,
154 (1984). In the early 1970s, after the Bahamian Government threatened Haitians
with deportation, new migrants headed directly to the United States. Id. Between 1972
and 1981, 40,000 to 50,000 Haitians illegally entered the United States. Id.
2. Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. §
1182 app. at 1259 (1988) [hereinafter Proclamation 4865]; Exec. Order No. 12,324,
46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app. at 1259 (1988) [here-
inafter Exec. Order 12,324]. The interdiction program was established on September
29, 1981. Id. See generally Arthur C. Helton, The United States Government Program
of Intercepting and Forcibly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Implica-
tions and Prospects, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. I. HUbM. RTS. 325, 325-32 [hereinafter Helton,
Haitian Policy Implications] (describing the establishment of the Haitian interdiction
program).
3. Agreement on Migrants-Interdiction, Sept. 23. 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T.
3559, 3560 [hereinafter Interdiction Agreement].
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returnees approximately six months after they had been involuntarily
repatriated.4 Based on these interviews, the State Department concluded
that the Haitian Government does not persecute repatriated Haitians who
had attempted to emigrate unlawfully to the United States.' This conclu-
sion is reflected in the advisory opinions the State Department provides
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).6 The INS often
relies upon State Department advisory opinions when considering the
claims of asylum applicants.7
Michael Ray, an attorney representing three Haitian nationals seeking
asylum in the United States, filed a series of Freedom of Information
Act (FOJA or the Act)' requests for copies of the interview reports. 9
Ray sought to contact the Haitian returnees interviewed by the State
Department to determine whether the advisory opinions accurately re-
4. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 544 (1991). The inter-
views were conducted by Department of State personnel from the United States Em-
bassy in Haiti. Joint Appendix at 56, United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct.
541 (1991) (No. 90-747) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
5. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct.
541 (1991) (No. 90-747) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. In the interviews, the re-
turnees described their living conditions and treatment following their return to Haiti.
Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 53-54. In arranging the interviews, the United States
promised to keep the returnees' identities confidential. Id. at 54.
6. Brief for Respondents at 1-2, United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct.
541 (1991) (No. 90-747) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. INS regulations require
that the INS seek comments from the State Department on each application for asy-
lum. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(6) (1992).
7. Arthur C. Helton, Proposed Regulations on Asylum: An Improvement or Ret-
rogression?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 18, 19 & n.20 [hereinafter Helton, Proposed
Regulations].
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). The Freedom of Information Act provides that "any
person" has a right to access all records of all federal government agencies unless
such records, or portions thereof, are protected from disclosure by one or more of
nine specific exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (b), (d) (1988); JusTiN D. FRANKLIN
& ROBERT F. BOUCHARD, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRI-
VACY AcrS § 1.02 (1993). Foreign citizens and aliens are included within the mean-
ing of "any person." Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 552 F.2d
132, 136 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
9. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 544 (1991). Ray repre-
sented several Haitian refugees who petitioned for political asylum in the United
States. Id. The INS claimed that the refugees had no reason to fear political persecu-
tion and cited to the series of interviews with the Haitian returnees. Joint Appendix,
supra note 4, at 21. Ray contended that the INS falsely reported or fabricated state-
ments made during the interviews. Id. at 25.
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flected the experiences of forcibly repatriated Haitian migrants."0 The
State Department, in fulfilling the FOIA request, redacted the names and
addresses of the returnees from the copies of the interview reports dis-
closed to Ray." The State Department relied on FOIA Exemption 6,12
which exempts from disclosure certain files that would result in a
"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 3 FOIA Exemption
6 requires a balancing of the public interest in the disclosure of the
requested information with the privacy interests of individuals likely to
be affected by such disclosure.'4 Congress intended the Freedom of
Information Act to favor disclosure. 5 Thus, the FOIA places a heavy
10. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6. at 3.
11. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544-45. The State Department provided Ray with twenty-
five documents describing interviews with Haitian returnees. Id. at 544. Names and
other identifying information concerning the returnees was redacted from seventeen of
the documents before they were delivered to Ray. It. at 544-45.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
13. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544. FOIA Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure "per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988). The
statute further requires that "[amny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are
exempt." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
14. Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1985). Both the
Senate and House Reports on the FOIA indicate Congress' intent that courts and
agencies balance the personal right to privacy against the public interest in disclosure.
Trina Jones, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public Sector: Disclosing Employee
Names and Addresses Under Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act, 89
MicH. L. REv. 980, 986 n.37 (1991). The Senate Report notes that the "phrase
'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy that will in-
volve a balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs
from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to gov-
ernmental information." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). Likewise,
the House Report states that the "limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy' provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's
right to privacy and the preservation of the public's right to governmental informa-
tion. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1966). reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428. See also Patrick Carome & Allan R. Adler, Exemption 6:
Personal Privacy, in LMGAfnON UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVEMNTIsrr LAws 119,
123-24 (Allan R. Adler ed., 17th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Carome, Personal Privacy]
(summarizing case law related to the Exemption 6 requirement that the interest in
personal privacy is balanced against the public interest in disclosure).
15. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (stating that the FOIA
was enacted by Congress to reflect "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure
unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language."); Depart-
ment of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (stating that "[dlisclosure, not
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burden on governmental agencies that seek to withhold information
under the Act. 6
In United States Department of State v. Ray, 7 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the names and addresses of forcibly repatriated
Haitian nationals were protected from disclosure under Exemption 6 of
the Freedom of Information Act. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court failed to consider the substantial public interest in the requested
information. Additionally, the Court overstated the privacy interests
involved in potential disclosure. Through a distorted application of
Exemption 6 balancing, the Court in Ray defeated an attempt to scruti-
nize governmental conduct regarding the highly controversial Haitian
interdiction program.2' Such scrutiny of governmental action is a prim-
secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."). The FOIA revised portions of a pre-
vious public disclosure statute, the Administrative Procedure Act, c. 324, § 3(c), 60
Stat. 238 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1988)). George S. Tolley III,
The Freedom of Information Act: Competing Interests in the Supreme Court, 1990
ANN. SERV. AM. L. 497, 498 n.6 (1991). Federal agencies had a great deal of discre-
tion under last clause of section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which al-
lowed them to withhold information from disclosure "for good cause found." Id Con-
gress, by 1966, considered the section too heavily weighted in favor of withholding,
rather than disclosing, information. Id. In response, the Freedom of Information Act
was enacted in 1966 to realize a philosophy of full agency disclosure. Id. at 498.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988) (stating that the governmental agency bears
the burden of sustaining an action to withhold records under the FOIA exemptions).
See Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 530 (1lth Cir. 1983) (noting that, under the FOIA,
there is a presumption that documents in the possession of a government agency are
subject to disclosure).
17. 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
18. See United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 545 (1991) (re-
versing the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision ordering disclosure of the
names and addresses of Haitian returnees); see also infra notes 98-110 and accompa-
nying text (describing relevant factors in the Supreme Court's Ray decision).
19. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (describing the public interests
associated with obtaining the names and addresses of Haitian returnees).
20. See infra notes 116-41 and accompanying text (discussing Haitian returnees'
privacy interests in the withheld information).
21. See Clara Germani, Battling for Boat People, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
17, 1992, at 13 (noting public protests of the interdiction program); Haiti Watch, Port
of Misery, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at B6 (noting controversy over the United
States Government's treatment of Haitian refugees); Susan McClain-Knight, Bush's
Haitian Policy Reflects Racist Atmosphere, ATLANTA CONST., June 13, 1992, at A14
(asserting that the United States' actions regarding the Haitian boat people are racist
and discriminatory); Thomas Palmer, Jr., When is Asylum Justified? Haiti's Proximity
Helps Fuel Emotional Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 1992, at 73 (noting contro-
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ary purpose of the Freedom of Information Act.'
This Note examines the Supreme Court's application of FOIA Exemp-
tion 6 to Haitian returnees. Part I provides a historical background to
the recent human rights abuses in Haiti.' In addition, Part I describes
the United States-Haiti Interdiction Agreement and the State
Department's monitoring program promulgated under that agreement.'
Part II provides the factual background of Ray and reviews the opinions
of the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court. Part In evaluates
the interests at issue in the Ray case.' Specifically, this section ad-
dresses the interests at stake in light of the recent turmoil in Haiti and
the controversy surrounding the treatment of Haitian migrants by the
United States. Part IV addresses the implications of the Supreme Court's
decision in Ray. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court, in al-
lowing the State Department to withhold the names of Haitian returnees,
incorrectly balanced the public and private interests in obtaining that
information. As a result, the primary goal of the Freedom of Informa-
versy over repatriation of Haitians seeking asylum). The United States' policy toward
Haitian migrants has also been widely condemned in the editorials of major American
newspapers. Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination,
10 N.Y.L. ScH. L Hum. RTS. 269, 320 (1993). One newspaper dubbed the interdic-
tion program "Operation Racist Shield." ld. (citing Operation Racist Shield, IdAIil
HERALD, Feb. 2, 1992, at 2C).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)
(stating that "[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to
the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and hold
the governors accountable to the governed."); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (noting that the FOIA was written to "pierce the veil of admin-
istrative secrecy and open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.)'; EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (stating that the FOIA seeks to "create a judicially en-
forceable public right to secure [governmental] information from possibly unwilling
official hands").
23. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text (describing recent human rights
abuses in Haiti).
24. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing the bilateral inter-
diction agreement between the United States and Haiti and the State Department's
program to monitor Haiti's compliance with that agreement).
25. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text (recounting the factual back-
ground of the Ray opinion); infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text (reviewing
opinions of the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court in Ray).
26. See infra notes 116-50 and accompanying text (analyzing the public and
private interests in disclosure of the names and addresses of Haitian returnees).
27. See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text (discussing the possible rami-
fications of the Ray opinion).
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tion Act - public scrutiny of agency action - is not being served in
the context of the United States-Haiti Interdiction Agreement.
I. THE INTERDICTION OF HAITIAN MIGRANTS
A. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN HAITI
Haiti, a nation located approximately 600 miles southeast of Flori-
da,' has a long history of political repression.29 The notorious twenty-
nine year dictatorship of the Duvaliers began in 1957 when Francois
Duvalier assumed power.3" Following his death in 1971, Francois
Duvalier was succeeded by his 19-year-old son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, as
President-for-Life.3' The Duvaliers' rule was characterized by violence
and severe human rights violations," including indiscriminate arrests,
torture and extrajudicial executions.3 The Tonton Macoutes, a secret
police militia created by Francois Duvalier, were primarily responsible
for these human rights violations.'
On February 7, 1986, Jean-Claude Duvalier was overthrown and re-
placed by the National Council of Government (CNG), a provisional
body led by General Henri Namphy, which was created to govern the
country and organize elections.3" In March of 1987, the Haitians ap-
proved a new constitution containing guarantees of fundamental rights.36
28. THOMAS E. WElL ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR HAITI 5 (1973). Haiti is lo-
cated on the western third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. Id.
29. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 1, at 4. See Gutekunst, supra note 1, at
152 (describing Haiti as "the poorest, most repressive country in the western hemi-
sphere"); infra notes 30-52 (describing the recent history of human rights abuses in
Haiti).
30. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 1, at 26. See generally JAMES FERGUSON,
PAPA Doc, BABY DOC: HAM AND THE DUVALIERS (1987) (describing the history of
Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti).
31. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 1, at 26. Jean-Claude Duvalier's age at
the time of his succession to the presidency remains a matter of some speculation, as
official records in Haiti are often altered or non-existent. FERGUSON, supra note 30, at
60.
32. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note I, at 26.
33. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMR No. 36/35/87, HAITI: DEATHS IN DETEN-
TION, TORTURE AND INHUMANE PRISON CONDITIONS 1 (1987) [hereinafter AMNESTY,
INHUMANE PRISON CONDITIONS].
34. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 1, at 26.
35. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 1, at 26.
36. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 1, at 26. The constitution also established
a more defined separation of powers, and forbade any former Duvalierist from run-
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Presidential elections were held on November 29, 1987." Three hours
into the voting, however, the elections were suspended when unidentified
men believed to belong to the Tonton Macoutes brutally murdered at
least thirty people standing in line to vote." The succeeding presidency
of Professor Leslie Manigat, who became Haiti's leader through sham
elections organized by the CNG,39 ended in June 1988 when the CNG
and Namphy again assumed power.' A few months later, on September
17, 1988, a coup ousted Namphy, and Lieutenant General Prosper Avril
was installed as leader of Haiti'
Due to mass protests against his rule, Avril stepped down on March
10, 1990.2 Three days later, a coalition of more than a dozen parties
known as the Unity Assembly appointed a Haitian Supreme Court
Judge, Ertha Pascal-Trouillant, to be president!' Pascal-Trouillant was
appointed with a mandate to organize elections under the supervision of
the United Nations and the Organization of American States."
On December 16, 1990, in the presence of at least 700 international
election observers," Haitians voted in the first truly democratic election
in the nation's history.' Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Roman Catholic
priest, won over sixty-seven percent of the vote in an election that in-
cluded eleven candidates! 7 Less than one year later, on September 29,
ning for public office for ten years. Id.
37. REFUGEE REFOULimENT, supra note 1, at 26.
38. AuESTY, INHDMANE PRISON CONDITIONS, supra note 33, at 1; Lee
Hockstader, Haitian Voters View Today's Election With Mixed Hope and Apprehen-
sion, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1990, at A34. The Tonton Macoutes were officially dis-
banded following the overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT,
supra note 1, at 29. Most of them, however, retained their weapons. Id. Many were
believed to have been incorporated into the Haitian security forces. AbNESTy, Imm-
MANE PRISON CONDTONS, supra note 33, at 1 n.1.
39. REFUGEE REFOULmENT, supra note 1, at 26.
40. REFUGEE REFOULEMNTr, supra note 1, at 26.
41. Steven Forester, Haitian Asylum Advocacy: Questions to Ask Applicants and
Notes on Interviewing and Representation, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 351, 440
(1993).
42. Kathie Klarreich, Haiti Battles for Free Election, CHRISTIAN Sci. Mo roR,
May 4, 1990, at 6.
43. Il
44. Forester, supra note 41, at 441.
45. Hockstader, supra note 38, at A34.
46. Forester, supra note 41, at 442.
47. Lee Hockstader & J.P. Slavin, Haiti Vote Peaceful Despite Irregularities,
VASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1990, at Al, A16. See also Bella Stumbo, From Horror to
Hope: For the First Time in Decades, Haiti has a Popularly Elected President, L.A.
19931
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1991, Aristide was overthrown in a military coup.48
Violent repression plagued Haiti immediately after the coup. 9 Hun-
dreds of Aristide supporters and suspected supporters were arrested,
detained without warrant, tortured and executed." Hundreds more were
shot indiscriminately when soldiers fired into crowds." At least 1,000
Haitians are estimated to have been killed as a result of the coup.52
B. THE UNITED STATES-HAITI INTERDICTION AGREEMENT
Haitians began fleeing to the United States by boat in the early
1970s. 3 By 1981, approximately 40,000 to 50,000 Haitians had entered
the United States illegally.' In 1981, the Reagan Administration ex-
pressed concern that illegal immigration had become a "serious national
problem detrimental to the United States." 5 President Reagan responded
TIMES, April 21, 1991, at 8 (describing events that culminated in the election of
Aristide).
48. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMR No. 36/03/92, HArI: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TRAGEDY, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE THE COUP 1 (1992) [hereinafter AM-
NEsTY, HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY]. Aristide was sent into exile in Venezuela after
negotiations between the military and the ambassadors from France, Venezuela and the
United States. Id.
49. Id. Violence was especially pronounced in Haiti's poor communities, which
had strongly supported Aristide. Id.
50. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMR No. 36/41/92, HAm: HUMAN RIGHTS HELD
RANSOM 3 (1992) [hereinafter AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS HELD RANSOM].
51. AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY, supra note 48, at 1. Soldiers reportedly
raided private homes, shot the unarmed occupants, and then forced relatives and
neighbors to bury the bodies. Id.
52. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHT-
MARE 9 (1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITrEE, HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE]. This
figure is based on reports of people who had visited the hospital and morgue in the
Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. Id. In addition, the Platform of Haitian Organizations
for the Defense of Human Rights has documented 1,021 cases of extrajudicial execu-
tions between October 1991 and August 1992. Id. at 9 n.7. See also Rights Group:
1,500 Killed in Haiti; Climate of Fear, Repression is Blamed on Security Forces,
ATLANTA CONST,, Jan. 22, 1992, at A5 (noting Amnesty International's calculation of
the number of Haitians killed since the September 1991 coup which ousted President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide).
53. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note I, at 49. See also supra note 1 (describ-
ing the recent history of the migration of Haitian boat people to the United States).
54. Gutekunst, supra note 1, at 154. These numbers are based on INS estimates.
Id.
55. Proclamation 4865, supra note 2, at 48,107. See also Coast Guard Over-
sight: Hearings on Military Readiness of International Programs, Subcomm. on the
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by creating an interdiction program intended to discourage the future
illegal migration of Haitians.56 The interdiction program directed the
Coast Guard to intercept and board vessels carrying undocumented aliens
and, except for passengers deemed to qualify for refugee status," to
Coast Guard and Navigation, Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1981) (testimony of David Hiller, Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral) (describing the large increase in illegal immigrants from the Caribbean Basin and
the need for the interdiction to prevent further negative impacts on communities such
as Miami, Florida).
56. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the establishment of the
interdiction program). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(0 (1988) (granting the President
authority to halt immigration which would be detrimental to national interests). At the
inception of the interdiction program, only two percent of all illegal aliens in the
United States were Haitians. REFUGEE REFOULENENr, supra note I, at 10.
57. A "refugee" is defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwill-
ing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion ....
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
imposes on all nations the commitment not to return or expel ("refouler') refugees.
Helton, Haitian Policy Implications, supra note 2, at 337. The Convention states, in
pertinent part, that:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion . . . .Con-
tracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art.
33.1, 34, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Article 33 was incorporated in
1967 into the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan, 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. Helton, Haitian Policy Implications, supra
note 2, at 337. The United States acceded to the Convention by joining the Protocol
in 1968. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 543 n.1 (1991). The
United States Supreme Court has asserted that the obligation of non-refoulement, the
commitment not to forcibly return aliens to a country where their life or freedom
would be jeopardized, is a "mandatory duty." Helton, Haitian Policy Implications,
supra note 2, at 337-38 & n.75 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429
(1987)). The principle of non-refoulement is considered to be the central doctrine of
international refugee law. GUNNEL SrENBERG. NON-ExPttsioN AND Nox-
REFOULEMENT: THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE REiOVAL OF REUGEES '%TrH SPECIAL
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return the aliens to their point of origin."
In addition, President Reagan directed the Secretary of State to enter
into cooperative agreements with foreign governments with the objective
of preventing illegal migration to the United States by sea. 9 The Unit-
ed States and Haiti entered into a cooperative agreement on September
23, 1981.' The agreement included an assurance by the Haitian Gov-
ernment that interdicted Haitians would not be prosecuted for illegal
departure.6 The State Department, seeking to monitor Haitian compli-
ance with the agreement, conducted interviews with a number of Haitian
returnees approximately six months after they had been returned to
Haiti. 2 On the recommendation of the United States Embassy in Haiti,
REFERENCE TO ARTICLES 32 AND 33 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES 171 (1989).
58. Proclamation No. 4865, supra note 2, at 48,107.
59. Exec. Order. No. 12,324, supra note 2, at 48,109.
60. Interdiction Agreement, supra note 3, at 3559. The cooperative agreement was
actually an exchange of diplomatic letters between Ernest Preeg, American Ambassa-
dor to Haiti, and Edouard Francisque, Haitian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Id.
61. Interdiction Agreement, supra note 3, at 3560, 3566. The agreement provides
that the United States, "[h]aving regard to the need for international cooperation re-
garding law enforcement measures taken with respect to vessels on the high seas and
the international obligations mandated in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees," is permitted to board Haitian vessels and to establish the "status of those on
board the vessel." Id. at 3559. If authorities of the United States determine that a
vessel is in violation of "United States immigration laws or appropriate Haitian laws,"
the Haitian Government agrees to permit the detention of the vessel on the high seas
by the United States Coast Guard and the return of such a vessel to Haiti. Id. at
3559-60. The agreement further states that:
The United States Government appreciates the assurances which it has
received from the Government of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians
returned to their country and who are not traffickers will not be subject
to prosecution for illegal departure.
It is understood that under these arrangements the United States Gov-
ernment does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom
the United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status.
Id. at 3560. The interdiction agreement was required because international law prohib-
its a country from intercepting another country's vessel on the high seas in the ab-
sence of such an agreement. Suzanne Gluck, Note, Intercepting Refugees at Sea: An
Analysis of the United States' Legal and Moral Obligations, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
865, 870 n.24 (1993).
62. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 544 (1991). The inter-
views were conducted by Department of State personnel from the United States Em-
bassy in Haiti. Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 56. The embassy obtained the names
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these follow-up interviews were discontinued after the overthrow of
Jean-Claude Duvalier in early 1986.'
11. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE V. RAY
A. FACrUAL BACKGROUND
Michael Ray, a Florida attorney, brought an action under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA)' on behalf of three undocumented Haitian
nationals.' Ray sought to prove that his clients faced a "well-founded
fear of persecution" if returned to Haiti' and, therefore, were entitled
to asylum in the United States.' The United States Government, rely-
and addresses of all the Haitian returnees from the United States Coast Guard, but
the embassy successfully interviewed very few due to the difficulties in locating the
returnees later. REFUGEE REFOULEMTNT, supra note I, at 24. By May 1985, embassy
officials, according to their own reports, had interviewed 1,052 of the returnees, or
23.28% of the total migrant returnee population at that time. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544
n.4. By November 1985, not a single Haitian interdicted at sea had been permitted to
apply for asylum in the United States. Arthur C. Helton, Organizational Schizophrenia
in the I.N.S., N.Y. TIMES, November 12, 1985, at A34.
63. Susan Freinkel, A Slow Leaking Boat to Limbo: The Plight of Haitian Boat
People is Now Making Headlines, But INS Records Point to Years of Seeming Indif-
ference to Their Asylum Claims, RECORDER, Dec. 19, 1991, at 1. The embassy's ra-
tionale for discontinuing the interviews was the expectation that governmental persecu-
tion would cease once the National Governing Council replaced Duvalier on February
7, 1986. REFUGEE REFOULErENT, supra note 1, at 24-25. The State Department also
ended the interview program because, it claimed, the program was too expensive to
maintain. Id. at 25.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). Under the Freedom of Information Act, all records of
federal government agencies must be made accessible to the public unless they fall
within a specific exemption to this disclosure requirement. Allan R. Adler, Overview
of the Freedom of Information Act, in LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOV-
ERNMENT LAws 1, 1 (Allan R. Adler ed., 17th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Adler, Overview
of the FOIA]. See supra note 8 (defining the Freedom of Information Act); infra note
74 (listing the nine exemptions to mandatory disclosure under the FOIA).
The Freedom of Information Act provides that, upon a complaint, the appro-
priate federal district court has jurisdiction to order the production of any improperly
withheld agency records. 5 U.S.C. § 552(4)(B) (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2466 (dis-
cussing use of judicial proceedings as a remedy for improper withholding of agency
records).
65. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. CL 541, 544 (1991).
66. Id
67. Id. To obtain asylum in the United States, an applicant must prove an un-
willingness or inability to return to the applicant's native country due to "persecution
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ing in part on State Department interviews with Haitian returnees,'
took the position that Ray's clients lacked the "well-founded fear of
persecution" necessary for asylum.'
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). This provision is nearly identical to the defi-
nition of "refugee" in Article 1 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, Jan, 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 268. Derek Smith,
Comment, A Refugee by Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals' Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681, 688 (1989). See supra
note 57 (quoting at length from the Immigration and Nationality Act's definition of
"refugee" and noting the United States' obligations under the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees).
68. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (describing State Department
interviews with Haitian returnees).
69. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544. The United States has consistently maintained that
the Haitians interdicted at sea are fleeing economic hardship, not political persecution.
Malissia Lennox, Comment, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687, 704 (1993). In
1978, for example, the INS insisted that Haitians were economic migrants, not politi-
cal refugees. Id. at 704 n.135 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023,
1030 (5th Cir. 1982)). State Department annual reports from 1981-1985 reflected the
United States Government's position that few, if any, Haitians were fleeing political
persecution. Id. The State Department recently maintained that it had not found any
evidence that Haitian returnees were being persecuted. See infra note 72 (quoting
State Department personnel).
Critics have strongly argued that Haitians fleeing to the United States are re-
sponding to political repression and not economic hardship. See Lennox, supra, at 705
(asserting that political factors have ignited the waves of Haitian boat people who
seek entry into the United States and documenting those factors and the resulting
migration); Little, supra note 21, at 311-15 (disputing the contention that fleeing
Haitians are simply economic refugees and arguing that such a position is inconsistent
with the statements of a number of United States officials regarding political repres-
sion in Haiti). Furthermore, human rights organizations have documented continual hu-
man rights abuses in Haiti in the years following the establishment of the interdiction
program. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE, HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 52, at
1, 9-20, 40 (stating that human rights abuses in Haiti from 1990 to mid-1992 were
"worse than at any time since the Duvalier era" and documenting extrajudicial execu-
tions, arbitrary arrests and torture against Haitians during that period); AMNESTY,
HUMAN RIGHTS HELD RANSOM, supra note 50, at 3-19 (documenting human rights
violations in Haiti between 1991 and 1992); AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY,
supra note 48, at 1-36 (documenting human rights abuses in the aftermath of the
September 1991 coup which overthrew democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide); AMNESTY, INHUMANE PRISON CONDITONS, supra note 33, at 1-10
(documenting human rights violations in Haiti during 1987). See also supra notes 29-
52 and accompanying text (describing the recent history of human rights abuses in
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Ray filed FOIA requests for the reports of the follow-up interviews
conducted by the State Department and subsequently used in the deter-
mination of asylum eligibility." Ray wanted to challenge the accuracy
of both the State Department's advisory opinions" and the
Government's public assertions that involuntarily repatriated Haitians
were not being persecuted upon their return to Haiti.' The State De-
Haiti).
70. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
has primary responsibility to decide asylum cases. 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 100.2 (1993). In
asylum cases, the INS frequently relies on advisory opinions from the Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), a branch of the State Department.
Helton, Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, at 18. In cases involving Haitians, the
BHRHA opinions are based to some extent on the interviews of Haitian returnees.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 1-2.
Applicants for political asylum, according to the appropriate regulations, "must
be provided with an opportunity to inspect, explain, and rebut" the BHRHA advisory
opinions. 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (1993). In addition, INS deportation procedures provide
that aliens have a right to examine the evidence against them. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)
(1988). Nevertheless, neither the governing statute nor regulations authorize discovery
in asylum proceedings, leaving the FOIA as the only procedure available to aliens
who seek INS information relevant to their cases. Brief for Respondents. supra note
6, at 3 (citing Maycock v. INS, 714 F. Supp. 1558, 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1989)).
71. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544. See supra note 70 (discussing role of State De-
partment advisory opinions in asylum proceedings).
72. Ray, 112 S. CL at 544. Ray's FOIA requests were prompted by statements of
officials of the United States that the Haitian returnees were not being persecuted.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 4. In March 1985, the Miami News printed
an editorial stating that the INS District Director for Miami had "offered to provide
names of 600 Haitians who had been sent back so that the doubters can go to Haiti
and speak to the people directly." Id. at 5. Ray filed a FOIA request with the INS
for that list of names of the 600 Haitians. Id. at 6. The INS claimed it did not have
such records and that the INS District Director had been misquoted. Id. Ray then
filed a FOIA request for written INS reports concerning the returnees and was told to
submit his request to the State Department. Id. Ray submitted a FOIA with the State
Department on July 30, 1985. Id. Nearly two years later, on July 3, 1987, the State
Department sent Ray the redacted documents which were at issue in this case. Id. at
7.
As recently as February 1992, the State Department opined that repatriated
Haitians were not being persecuted after their return. See Al Kamen, State Dept.
Finds No Evidence of Reprisals Alleged by Haitian Refugees, WASH. POST, Feb. 11,
1992, at A12 (quoting State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher that there is
"no evidence" that Haitian returnees are being persecuted); Al Kamen, Haiti's Military
Said to Beat, Kill Some Returnees, L.A. TIMIES, Feb. 10, 1992, at Al, A12 (quoting
Secretary of State James A. Baker III that there is "not one single documented case"
of a Haitian returnee suffering persecution following repatriation to Haiti).
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partment released twenty-five documents, but redacted the names and
other identifying information relating to the Haitian returnees on seven-
teen of those documents.73 In refusing to disclose the redacted informa-
tion, the State Department relied on FOIA Exemption 6, which exempts
from release "personnel and medical and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal priva-
cy.,74
Ray filed suit against the State Department seeking disclosure of the
redacted information." The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida ordered disclosure.76 The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed.7 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision,78 thus allowing the State Department to withhold the names
and addresses of the Haitian returnees it had interviewed.
73. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544-45.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988). The Freedom of Information Act contains nine
exemptions which protect specific types of information from mandatory disclosure. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988) (listing the nine disclosure exemptions). The exemp-
tions shield: (1) national security information; (2) internal agency rules; (3) informa-
tion exempted by other statutes; (4) privileged or confidential business information; (5)
inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda; (6) information that would constitute an
invasion of personal privacy; (7) law enforcement records; (8) records of financial
institutions; and (9) data concerning oil wells. Id. See generally, LmGATION UNDER
THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAwS 29-83, 99-173 (Allan R. Alder ed., 17th ed.
1992) (discussing the nine exemptions to the FOIA).
75. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F. Supp 502, 503 (S.D. Fla.
1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1549 (lth Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. United States Dep't of
State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
76. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502, 505 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (ordering the release of information redacted by the State Department). affd.
908 F.2d 1549 (Ilth Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. United States Dep't of State v. Ray,
112 S. Ct. 541 (1991). See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (discussing deci-
sion of the Florida District Court).
77. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1552 (lth Cir. 1990)
(affirming the district court's decision entitling Ray to the receipt of the names of
Haitian nationals returned to Haiti), rev'd sub nom. United States Dep't of State v.
Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991). See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (discussing
Eleventh Circuit decision).
78. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 545 (1991) (holding
that Haitians seeking asylum are not entitled to the State Department's list of names
and addresses of Haitian returnees). See infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's opinion).
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S BASIS FOR ORDERING DISCLOSURE
In September 1987, Ray filed a motion in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida for an order requiring the
State Department to release the unredacted interview summaries.' The
State Department opposed the motion based on FOIA Exemption 6 and
filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment.' The State Depart-
ment supported its position with an affidavit by John Eaves, the Acting
Deputy Director of the Office of Mandatory Review of the State
Department's Classification and Declassification Center.' The Eaves
affidavit stated that disclosure of the names of those Haitians inter-
viewed would subject them to "possible embarrassment in their social
and community relationships."' The affidavit further stated that the
Haitian returnees consented to be interviewed with the understanding
that their conversations with embassy officers would be confidential."
The district court began its analysis by asserting that an exemption
claim under the FOIA requires that the government bear the burden of
demonstrating the basis for nondisclosure, ' a burden which could not
be met solely through the use of an affidavit.' In balancing the Haitian
79. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 7. Ray argued for the release of the
redacted information in order to assure the safe relocation of returnees and to deter-
mine if the United States had been adequately monitoring Haiti's commitment not to
persecute the returnees. Id. at i. Ray also sought access to the information to deter-
mine whether the United States had actually investigated and accurately reported the
returnees' claims. Id.
80. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 7.
81. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 5. Eaves stated that the redacted
documents contained reports from Haiti of confidential interviews of involuntarily
returned Haitians, which were conducted by State Department officials. Id. The pur-
pose of the interviews, he noted, was to determine if any individuals had been mis-
treated once they were returned to Haiti. Id. He further asserted that, although the
names and other identifying information had been redacted, the entire substance of the
reports had been released to Ray. Id at 5-6.
82. Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 43. Eaves contended that disclosure would
constitute an invasion into the privacy interests of the returned Haitians. Id. He fur-
ther asserted that, in his opinion, the redacted material was protected from disclosure
under FOIA Exemption 6. Id
83. Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 42-43.
84. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502. 504 (S.D. Fla.
1989), aft'd, 908 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub noma. United States Dep't of
State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991). According to the language of the FOIA, "the
burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
85. Ray, 725 F. Supp. at 504. "TIhe District Court must do something more to
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returnees' right to privacy against the public's right to governmental
information, the district court asserted that the invasion of privacy must
be "actual rather than just theoretical" and more than a "mere possibili-
ty."86 The district court considered the invasion of privacy from the
"mere disclosure" of the names and addresses of interviewed Haitian
returnees to be minimal and speculative.' Finding the safety of repatri-
ated Haitians to be a legitimate public interest, the district court ordered
disclosure of the redacted information."
C. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S BASIS FOR AFFIRMING THE ORDER
COMPELLING DISCLOSURE
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling
disclosure.89 In contrast to the lower court, the court of appeals began
the balancing process by expressly acknowledging that Ray intended to
use the redacted information to contact Haitian returnees.' This resulted
in a "significant" privacy interest to be weighed against disclosure.9 '
The court of appeals, however, held that disclosure was still mandated
due to the public interest in determining whether the United States Gov-
assure itself of the factual basis and bona fides of [an] agency's claim of exemption
than rely solely upon an affidavit." Id. (citing Stephenson v. IRS, 629 F.2d 1140 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
86. Id. (citing Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380 n.19 (1976)).
87. Id. at 505.
88. Id. The court held that the State Department's promise of confidentiality was
only one factor to be considered and not a sufficient basis to protect the names and
other identifying information from disclosure. Id. at 504. See Washington Post v.
United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(noting that promises of confidentiality, standing alone, do not defend against disclo-
sure); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating that an agency's
promise of confidentiality is insufficient to override disclosure mandated by the
FOIA); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that an
agency cannot avoid disclosure simply by asserting that it received information under
a pledge of confidentiality).
89. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1552 (lth Cir. 1990),
rev'd sub. nom. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
90. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1554. The district court had weighed the degree of invasion
of personal privacy only by considering the invasion caused by the actual disclosure
of the names of interviewed Haitian returnees. Ray, 725 F. Supp. at 505. See supra
notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the district court),
91. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1554. The court also stated that, although the promise of
confidentiality added weight to the privacy interests, it was a factor which, by itself,
could not override the disclosure requirements of the FOIA. Id.
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ernment is adequately monitoring Haiti's compliance with its promise
not to persecute returnees. ' In addition, the court of appeals found a
legitimate public interest in learning whether or not the Government is
being truthful in its public statements concerning Haiti's treatment of
returnees. 3 The court of appeals noted that the information sought by
Ray and his clients will assist them in judging the accuracy of the Unit-
ed States Government's assertions?' Consequently, the public interests
outweighed any heightened privacy concerns.' Reflecting the reasoning
of the lower court, the court of appeals noted that the Government had
the burden of proving that Exemption 6 applied and had failed to sus-
tain that burden.' Thus, disclosure was orderede
D. THE SUPREME COURT'S REVERSAL
1. The Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals,' holding that the redaction of names
and other identifying information was lawful under FOIA Exemption
6? The Court initiated its discussion of Exemption 6 balancing by
noting that Congress had explicitly authorized the redaction of identify-
ing details which were construed to constitute a "clearly unwarranted"
invasion of privacy." ° The Court then resolved the question of whether
92. ld. at 1554-55.
93. Id. at 1555.
94. Id.
95. AL The court noted that its decision reflected an obligation to construe the
FOIA disclosure requirements broadly and its exemptions narrowly. Id. at 1556. See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (noting that the FOIA was intended to
heavily favor disclosure).
96. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1556.
97. Id. at 1556-57.
98. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 543 (1991). Justice
Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter. Id. Justices Scalia and Kennedy
joined in all but Part mI of the opinion, which discussed the privacy interests of the
Haitian returnees. Id. Justice Scalia filed a concurrence in which Justice Kennedy
joined. Id See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (describing the Scalia con-
currence). Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 543.
99. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550.
100. Id. at 547 & n.9. The Freedom of Information Act states, in relevant part
that, "[tlo the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
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the redacted interview summaries complied with the disclosure mandates
of the Freedom of Information Act.'
The Supreme Court found the privacy interest of the Haitian returnees
to be more substantial than recognized by the court of appeals." Spe-
cifically, the Court emphasized the significance of Ray's intention to
contact the Haitian returnees that had been interviewed by State Depart-
ment personnel." This fact, asserted the Court, "magnifies the impor-
tance" of the privacy interest at stake."0 The Court stated that "great
weight" must be given to the privacy interest in protecting Haitian re-
turnees from "any retaliatory action that might result from a renewed
interest in their aborted attempt to emigrate."'"
The Court acknowledged a public interest in determining whether the
State Department had adequately monitored Haiti's formal assurances not
to prosecute Haitian returnees." The Court, however, asserted that the
public interest in the redacted information was minimal because disclo-
sure of that information, by itself, would not provide any additional in-
sight into the State Department's performance of its obligation to ensure
that the Haitian Government was not prosecuting the returnees." 7
The Court recognized that the value of the redacted information
stemmed not from actual disclosure, but from the possible use of that
information to contact returnees."~ Nonetheless, Justice Stevens asserted
that the Court did not need to address the question of whether the "de-
privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes
an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1988). Following redaction, FOIA requires that "[a]ny reasonably
segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record
after deletion of the portions which are exempt." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
101. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 548.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 549. The Court asserted that it could not "overlook the fact that re-
spondents plan to make direct contact with the individual Haitian returnees identified
in the reports." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 548.
106. Id. at 549. See Interdiction Agreement, supra note 3, at 3560 (stating that
Haiti will not prosecute repatriated Haitians for attempting to emigrate to the United
States); supra note 61 (quoting the interdiction agreement between the United States
and Haiti).
107. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 549. The Court stated that the public interest in the State
Department's performance had been adequately satisfied by the redacted interview
summaries. Id.
108. Id.
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rivative use"'"I9 of documents would justify the release of information
concerning private individuals."' Thus, the Supreme Court applied de-
rivative use considerations in determining the "great weight" to be ac-
corded the privacy interests in the redacted information, but refused to
address derivative use when considering public interests in that same
information.
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he stressed his
109. Id. "Derivative use" refers to use of requested information, which may 6r
may not have an intrinsic public value, to generate publicly valuable information
through investigations made possible only by disclosure of that information. Id. at 550
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
110. Id. at 549-50. The government had urged the court to adopt a per se rule
prohibiting the consideration of "derivative use" in weighing the public interest side
of FOIA balancing. Md at 549. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5. at 26 (arguing
for categorical rule excluding "derivative use" factors in determining significance of
public interest).
The Court struggled to avoid addressing the issue of "derivative use" in the
context of the public interest in the redacted information. The Court asserted that
"nothing in the record" suggested that a second series of interviews with Haitian
returnees would produce any additional relevant information. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 549.
The Court further stated that:
We are . . . unmoved by respondents' asserted interest in ascertaining
the veracity of the interview reports. There is not a scintilla of evidence,
either in the documents themselves or elsewhere in the record, that tends
to impugn the integrity of the reports. We generally accord government
records and official conduct a presumption of legitimacy.
Id. at 550. Notwithstanding the Court's unequal application of "derivative use" consid-
erations to shield information from disclosure, this assertion of a "presumption of le-
gitimacy" that protects government records from disclosure is directly counter to the
explicit purpose and function of the FOIA. See Curie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523, 530
(11th Cir. 1983) (stating that, under the FOIA, information held by the government is
"presumed subject to disclosure") (emphasis added); supra note 22 (citing cases which
note that the basic function of the FOIA is to hold the government accountable by
opening agency action up to public scrutiny). The public interest in determining that
government actions are legitimate is certainly as important as determining that they
are not. See Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Se'vs.,
690 F.2d 252, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that "the purpose of FOIA is to permit
the public to decide for itself whether government action is proper . . . . Mhe public
interest in disclosure is not diminished by the possibility or even the probability that
[the government] is doing its . . . job right."); infra note 146 (noting that the
principal purpose of the Freedom of Information Act is permit public oversight of
governmental actions).
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belief that, in balancing an Exemption 6 claim, the only consideration
should be what the information itself reveals, not the invasion of privacy
that results from use of disclosed information."' Scalia noted that,
while the Court had explicitly abstained from addressing derivative use
when discussing the public interest side of FOIA Exemption 6 balanc-
ing, the majority applied derivative use considerations when according
weight to the privacy interest side of the equation."' Scalia asserted
that any consideration of derivative use was unnecessary to the Court's
decision because the disclosure of the redacted information would itself
reveal the names of individuals who had reported to a foreign power the
conduct of their own government."' This, Scalia noted, was "infor-
mation that a person did not ordinarily wish to be known about
himself.""' Finding no public interest in disclosure itself, Scalia as-
serted that disclosure thus constituted a "clearly unwarranted" privacy
invasion justifying redaction under Exemption 6."'
I. THE APPLICATION OF THE FOIA PRIVACY EXEMPTION
TO HAITIAN RETURNEES
A. THE MINIMAL PRIVACY INTERESTS OF HAITIAN RETURNEES
Under the Freedom of Information Act, foreign nationals are entitled
to the same privacy rights as United States citizens."6 Thus, the initial
111. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550. Scalia asserted this position eight years earlier, while
sitting on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Arieff v. United
States Dep't of the Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Scalia, writing for
the court, stated that "Exemption [6] does not apply to an invasion of privacy pro-
duced as a secondary effect of the release . . . . it is the very production of the
documents which must constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"
Arieff, 712 F.2d at 1468 (internal quotations omitted). In 1989, however, the District
of Columbia Circuit stated that "secondary effects" could be considered an invasion of
privacy under Exemption 6. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer,
879 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that "[w]here there is a substantial proba-
bility that disclosure will cause an interference with personal privacy, it matters not
that there may be two or three links in the causal chain."), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1078 (1990).
112. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 551. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Court's balancing of the interests in the redacted information).
113. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 551.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. FRANKuN & BOUCHARD, supra note 8, § 1.0913] (citing Shaw v. Department
of State, 559 F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (D.D.C. 1983)). See also David C. Boyle, Note,
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step in the Exemption 6 balancing process with respect to Haitian re-
turnees is an assessment of the personal privacy interests at issue."' To
withhold documents under Exemption 6, a governmental agency must
establish that disclosure would constitute an invasion of privacy and,
then, that the invasion would be clearly unwarranted."' Courts have
weighed a number of factors when considering the magnitude of the
privacy interest implicated by governmental disclosure of lists of names
and addresses."' One factor particularly relevant to Haitian returnees is
Proposal to Amend the United States Privacy Act to Extend Its Protections to Foreign
Nationals and Non-Resident Aliens, 22 CORNEIL INT'L LJ. 285, 288-89 & n.23
(1989) (noting that the FOIA applies to aliens and foreigners).
117. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Exemption 6 balancing
process). Under the language of the FOIA, Exemption 6 only protects "personnel".
"medical", and "similar" files from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988). Most
courts, however, have declined to focus on the nature of the file, moving quickly to
an analysis of the privacy interests implicated by disclosure. Carome, Personal Priva-
cy, supra note 14, at 120. See United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co.,
456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982) (holding that the phrase "similar files" has a broad mean-
ing and that the applicability of Exemption 6 is governed by the balancing of public
and private interests, not the nature of the files); Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 376-77 (1976) (stating that "similar files" were those files that
implicated privacy values similar to those implicated by disclosure of personnel or
medical files); Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 219 (3rd Cir.
1977) (emphasizing that the term "similar files" is not to be construed in a narrow or
technical way); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 135 (stating that the
term "similar files" does not narrow Exemption 6 to permit the release of files that
would otherwise qualify for exemption due to privacy considerations).
In addition, courts have specifically held that lists of names and addresses are
"similar files" within the meaning of FOIA Exemption 6. See IBEW Local Union No.
3 v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1177, 1181 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that names and addresses
of present government employees were "similar files"); Minnis v. Department of
Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the names and addresses of
applicants for permits to travel down a river were "similar files"), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1053 (1985). The requestors in Ray did not challenge the classification of the
State Department interview report summaries, and it was therefore not an issue in the
case. Ray, 725 F. Supp. at 504 n.2.
118. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing the Exemption 6 bal-
ancing process).
119. See generally Paul A. Rubin, Note, Applying the Freedom of Information
Act's Privacy Exemption to Requests for Lists of Names and Addresses, 58 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1033, 1038-41 (1990) (discussing factors considered by courts applying FOIA
Exemption 6); Carome, Personal Privacy, supra note 14, at 137-38 (discussing Ex-
emption 6 privacy considerations with respect to lists of names and addresses);
FRANI N & BOUCHARD, supra note 8, § 1.0913] (describing considerations that may
affect the significance of the Exemption 6 privacy interest).
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whether it is reasonably likely that disclosure would result in serious
harm to the individuals named in the State Department interview sum-
maries."m
Based on an affidavit by a State Department employee,' the United
States Government in Ray argued that disclosure of the names of Hai-
tian interviewees would subject the interviewees to "possible embarrass-
ment" because such disclosure would publicly identify them as people
who cooperated with the United States Government by furnishing infor-
mation concerning Haiti's treatment of the returnees." Courts have,
however, generally found declarations, standing alone, to be insufficient
to bring information within the scope of Exemption 6 protection."
The privacy interest at stake must be tangible and substantial; 24 it is
120. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility at 8, United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112
S. Ct. 541 (1991) (No. 90-747) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of ACLU]. A number of
judicial decisions reflect a consideration of whether disclosure is likely to cause sig-
nificant harm to the subject of the requested information. See United States Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989)
(holding that a private citizen had a strong privacy interest in a rap sheet that con-
tained information likely to hurt his reputation); United States Dep't of State v.
Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599, 601 (1982) (noting that Iranian nationals
living in Iran may have a significant privacy interest in records indicating their Amer-
ican citizenship as disclosure would place them in physical danger); Department of
the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 381 (1976) (stating that Air Force Academy
cadets had a strong privacy interest in summaries of ethics hearings identifying them
as honor code violators, as their professional military standing would likely be dam-
aged). In addition, the legislative history of Exemption 6 reflects Congress' intent to
exempt from disclosure "those kinds of files the disciosure of which might harm the
individual." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. § 11 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428.
121. Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 40. See supra notes 81-83 and accompany-
ing text (describing affidavit submitted by the government in Ray).
122. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 29. See supra note 82 and accompa-
nying text (quoting affidavit).
123. See, e.g., King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 218-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (stating that declarations are insufficient if they are conclusory, vague or
sweeping); Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir 1982) (stating that "glib
government assertions" are insufficient and declarations must be detailed and
nonconclusory); Campbell v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682
F.2d 256, 265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that the government fails to meet its bur-
den by submitting conclusory declarations which lack supporting detail).
124. FRANKLIN & BoucHARD, supra note 8, § 1.09(3]. See Department of Air
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380 n.19 (1976) (noting that "Exemption 6 was direct-
ed at threats to privacy interests more palpable than mere possibilities").
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insufficient that disclosure causes only embarrassment."
Furthermore, any "embarrassment" or stigma that Haitian returnees
might suffer as a result of their failed attempt to emigrate would have
been inflicted at the time of the repatriation itself' or at the initial
government interview prior to repatriation.'" As the Haitian Govern-
ment can already identify those who attempted to flee,'" the disclosure
of the names of the interviewees will only reveal the identities of Hai-
tians who, subsequent to their return, spoke to representatives of the
United States Government." Thus, the Florida District Court correctly
recognized that the privacy invasion from the actual disclosure of the
125. Schell v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 843 F.2d 933, 939
(6th Cir. 1988).
126. Brief of Amici Curiae The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human
Rights Watch, The Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., The National Coalition for Haitian
Refugees, Public Citizen and The Freedom of Information Clearinghouse at 11, United
States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991) (No. 90-747) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief of Lawyers Committee]. Following the interdiction of a boat carrying Haitian
nationals, the Coast Guard notifies the State Department Returnee Officer in Haiti of
the number of people on the boat and the estimated time of arrival in Haiti. REFu-
GEE REFOULMENT, supra note 1, at 23-24. The Returnee Officer relays this infor-
mation to the Haitian Foreign Ministry, the Haitian Immigration Service, and the Hai-
tian Red Cross. Id. at 24. Representatives from each of these organizations meet the
Coast Guard cutter on its arrival in Port-au-Prince and receive a copy of the ship's
manifest bearing the names, ages, and places of residence of the Haitian returnees. Id.
127. Amicus Brief of Lawyers Committee, supra note 126. at 11. After a vessel
carrying Haitians is interdicted, the interdictees board a Coast Guard cutter to be
interviewed by an INS officer. REFUGEE REFOUIEMENT, supra note 1. at 20. The INS
examiners ask each interdictee questions concerning his or her name, age, address,
reason for leaving, and fear of return. Id. at 20-22. Although each person is inter-
viewed individually, these inquiries are sometimes conducted within the hearing of
other Haitian passengers. Id. at 20. In addition, the Haitian Government is no doubt
aware that these interviews take place.
128. See supra note 126 (noting that branches of the Haitian Government are
given a list of the names and addresses of all Haitian interdictees).
129. Disclosure of the names could actually benefit the returnees. Amicus Brief of
Lawyers Committee, supra note 126, at 11. For example, human rights groups such
as Amnesty International often use the publication of names as a method to try to
protect victims of human rights abuses against further persecution. Id. See, e.g., Am.
NESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS HELD RANSOM, supra note 50, at 36-40 (listing the names of
Haitians who have been illegally arrested); AhmESTY, HUMtAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY,
supra note 48, at 29-32 (naming Haitian trade unionists, human rights monitors, and
students that have been harassed and beaten by Haitian authorities); AMNESTY, INIU-
MANE PRISON CONDrTIONS, supra note 33, at 2-13 (containing names and photographs
of Haitians tortured while in detention).
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names of Haitian interviewees is minimal and does not meet the "clearly
unwarranted" standard of Exemption 6."'
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, however, that Ray's
intention to contact the Haitian interviewees creates an invasion of pri-
vacy beyond that implicated by the disclosure itself."' The Supreme
Court reinforced this construction by finding that Ray's plan to inter-
view the Haitian returnees magnified the returnees' privacy interests.'
Neither court, however, explained why a private citizen's intention to
interview returnees is more intrusive than the government's own behav-
ior in conducting fundamentally the same interviews with the same
individuals."'
If the returnees have not suffered persecution, as the United States
Government publicly maintains, then simple confirmation of that fact is
unlikely to impact negatively on contacted individuals." 4 If, however,
the returnees are being persecuted, any contact with them may help
substantiate their claims, and benefit any asylum claim in the future."'
130. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (outlining the opinion of the
district court).
131. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1554. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (out-
lining the opinion of the court of appeals).
132. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 549. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's construction of the privacy interests at stake).
133. Amicus Brief of Lawyers Committee, supra note 126, at 10. Although the
State Department discontinued the interviews after the overthrow of Jean-Claude
Duvalier in 1986, it was not due to privacy concerns. Id. at 11. Rather, the State
Department believed that the interviews were unnecessary after the fall of the
Duvalier government, and the interview program was too expensive to maintain. REF-
UGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 1, at 24-25.
134. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 23. Although even benign contact
with the returnees may still constitute an invasion of privacy, this invasion must out-
weigh the public interests at stake to qualify for exemption from disclosure. See supra
note 14 (discussing the requirement of a balancing test when applying the Freedom of
Information Act's privacy exemptions). See also infra notes 142-50 and accompanying
text (describing the substantial public interests at issue in Ray).
135. Amicus Brief of Lawyers Committee, supra note 126, at 11. Asylum claims
are considered in light of State Department advisory opinions based, in part, on the
interview summaries at issue in Ray. See supra note 70 (describing the reliance by
the INS on advisory opinions). Consequently, the discovery that the advisory opinions
inaccurately reflect the situation in Haiti, and that Haitian returnees are being perse-
cuted following their return, would future impact asylum proceedings. See supra note
61 (noting that the interdiction agreement between the United States and Haiti in-
cludes an assurance by the Haitian Government that it will not prosecute returnees);
supra note 57 (noting that the United States is obligated, under both domestic and
international refugee law, to not return aliens to a country where they would likely
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Finally, it is important to recognize that Haitians are free to simply
refuse to respond to inquiries concerning their situation in Haiti and
their contact with State Department personnel.' '5
Thus, both the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court overstated the significance "of the privacy interest of the Haitian
returneesY The court of appeals nonetheless ordered disclosure of the
redacted names due to the importance of the public interests at stake.u3
The Supreme Court reversed."
In allowing the State Department to withhold the requested names, the
Supreme Court seriously understated the substantial public interests at
issue in Ray."4° Furthermore, the Court's decision did not adequately
address the impact of the "derivative use" of requested information on
the Exemption 6 balancing process."'
B. THE SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NAmES OF HAITIAN
RETURNEES INTERVIEWED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
The Haitian interdiction program has been the subject of considerable
controversy." Numerous Haitians have fled to the United States since
the beginning of the interdiction program, but the majority have been
interdicted and involuntarily repatriated.' 3 Consequently, the public has
face persecution). In fact, Haitian migrants who make a second attempt to enter the
United States by boat, after having once been repatriated by the United States Coast
Guard, stand a much greater chance of obtaining asylum. See Lennox, supra note 69,
at 707 n.157 (noting that so-called "double-backers" are generally granted admission
into the United States) (citing Howard W. French, Dozens Flee Haiti a Second Time,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10, 1992, at Al).
136. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6. at 23.
137. The Eleventh Circuit found the privacy interest to be "significant.' Raqy 903
F.2d at 1554. The Supreme Court stated that the privacy interest "must be given
great weight." Ray, 112 S. CL at 548.
138. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1554. The court of appeals noted that disclosure was man-
dated under the FOIA because the public interest in disclosure outweighed the
returnees' privacy interests. Id.
139. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the Supreme Court's opinion and basis for reversal).
140. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (noting the significant public
interest in the disclosure of the names of Haitian interviewees).
141. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text (defining and discussing the
derivative use issue).
142. See supra note 21 (noting widespread controversy generated by the Haitian
interdiction program).
143. Helton, Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, at 18. Between 1981. the incep-
19931 409
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a number of substantial interests in obtaining the names of Haitians
interviewed by the State Department.' " First, the public has an interest
in the safe relocation of forcibly repatriated Haitians who have unsuc-
cessfully sought asylum in the United States.45 Second, the public has
an interest in ascertaining whether the United States has effectively mon-
itored Haiti's obligation not to persecute returnees."4 Finally, the pub-
lic has an interest in evaluating the United States Government's basis
for denying asylum to Haitian refugees 47 and the weight given to the
tion of the interdiction program, and 1987, over 12,000 Haitian refugees were inter-
cepted at sea and not one of them was granted asylum. Id. By November 1989, the
Coast Guard had intercepted over 21,000 Haitians and only six were granted entry to
the United States on asylum claims. Bill Frelick, Double Dealings, WASH. PoST, Nov.
18, 1989, at A23. By May 1991, only 28 of over 24,000 Haitians intercepted since
the beginning of the program had been allowed entry into the United States to apply
for asylum. Freinkel, supra note 63, at 1; Helton, Haitian Policy Implications, supra
note 2, at 330.
Following the overthrow of Aristide on September 30, 1991, Haitians fled to
the United States in record numbers. 138 CONG. REC. S13095 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
1992) (statement of Senator Deconcini). In the eight month period following the coup,
over 38,000 Haitians were intercepted by the Coast Guard. Helton, Haitian Policy
Implications, supra note 2, at 330. By November of 1992, more than two-thirds of
those Haitians had been forcibly repatriated. Islands of Inequality, WASH. POST, Nov.
4, 1992, at A18.
144. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 14, 31. See infra notes 145-50 and
accompanying text (outlining the specific public interests at issue).
145. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1555. The court of appeals noted that the government had
conceded a legitimate public interest in the safe relocation of the Haitian returnees.
Id. The government, however, argued that disclosure of the redacted information
would not serve this interest. Id.
146. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 14, 31. Courts have held that the
public has a legitimate interest in the oversight of governmental actions. See IBEW
Local Union No. 41 v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 763 F.2d 435,
436 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that the purpose of the FOIA is to permit the public to
survey the operations of the government); Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 172 &
n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that the main purpose of the FOIA is to provide "ma-
terial for monitoring the Government's activities"); Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. Unit-
ed States Dep't of Agric., 602 F. Supp. 534, 537 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the
public has an interest in learning whether the government is abiding by its commit-
ment to effectively monitor the health effects of herbicide spraying); National Associa-
tion of Atomic Veterans v. Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, 583 F. Supp. 1483,
1487 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that the public has an interest in the government's effec-
tiveness in disseminating health information to veterans).
147. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 14, 31. Remarking on a predecessor
bill to the FOIA, a member of Congress stated that freedom of information legislation
was important because "fair and just administrative proceedings require [that individ-
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interviews conducted by State Department personnel.' These public
concerns raise the more general question of whether the United States is
complying with international accords governing the treatment of refu-
gees.'49 The only means of evaluating the veracity of the United States
Government's assertions concerning its efforts to comply with interna-
tional law regarding the non-refoulement of Haitian refugees is to obtain
the names of Haitians interviewed by the State Department and to con-
tact them in order to inquire about their experience with both State
Department personnel and the Haitian Government.'
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING "DERIVATIVE USES"
The use of material requested under the Freedom of Information Act
uals] ... be informed in advance about the decisions which the administrative agen-
cies and departments may use as precedent in determining their matter." 110 Co.x6.
REc. 17,088 (1964) (comments of Senator Dirksen on S. 1666), cited in Rubin, supra
note 119, at 1042 n.50 (1990).
148. See supra note 70 (describing the INS's reliance on State Department advi-
sory opinions based, in part, on the interviews with repatriated Haitians). Although the
interviews were discontinued in 1986, the State Department continues to rely on them.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 3 n.2. In an affidavit filed with the Supreme
Court, the State Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
stated that currently the interview summary reports "are not a major factor in evalu-
ating present conditions in Haiti." Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 58. The public's
interest in the names of Haitians interviewed for these reports, however, is not limited
by the degree of their present use. The public has an interest in determining whether
the reports are accurate and whether the government, relying on those reports both in
the past and in the present, is being truthful when it opines that Haitians returned
since the start of the interdiction program have not suffered political persecution. See
supra notes 69, 72 (noting that officials of the United States Government have repeat-
edly expressed the opinion that Haitian returnees were not being persecuted).
149. See supra note 57 (noting that the United States is obligated to comply with
international agreements prohibiting that return of refugees facing political persecution).
150. The Supreme Court claimed that there was no public interest in ascertaining
the veracity of the interview reports because there was no evidence suggesting they
were untruthful. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550. See supra note 110 (quoting from the Su-
preme Court's opinion). Congress, however, has stated that the public interest in dis-
closure under the FOIA is "the right of an individual to be able to find out how his
government is operating." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. § 6 (1966). re-
printed in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2423. This right is not lessened by the likelihood that
the government is adequately fulfilling its obligations. Washington Post Co. v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See
supra note 146 (noting that public oversight of governmental actions is a central aim
of the FOIA).
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to generate publicly valuable information not revealed by the disclosure
itself has been referred to as "derivative use.'' The resulting public
benefits and private invasions have been called the "secondary effects"
of disclosure.' Much of the litigation concerning derivative use is
similar to Ray in that it involves requests for lists of names and ad-
dresses.' Generally, courts have found no public interest in cases
where the requests were made for purely commercial purposes." In
cases where the requests for names were made for purposes other than
commercial concerns, however, courts have found significant public
interests which mandated disclosure.' Specifically, courts have ordered
the disclosure of information used to identify particular persons when
that information enabled the public to determine whether an agency's
practices were fair and nondiscriminatory.'" Thus, where the derivative
151. See supra note 109 (defining "derivative use").
152. See Arieff v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (discussing the secondary effect of disclosure of information under Exemp-
tion 6 of the FOIA).
153. See FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 8, § 109[5] (discussing cases which
address the derivative use of information requested under the FOIA).
154. FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 8, § 109[5]. See, e.g., Multnomah Coun-
ty Medical Soc'y v. Scott, 825 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
physicians' professional organization was not entitled to the names and addresses of
Medicare beneficiaries); Minnis v. Department of Agric., 737 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir.
1984) (protecting the names and addresses of rafting permit applicants from disclosure
to a business located on a river), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Wine Hobby
USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that a distributor of
wine-making equipment was not entitled to a list of the names and addresses of
individuals licensed to produce wine at home).
155. FRANKLIN & BOUCHARD, supra note 8, § 109[5]. See, e.g., Florida Rural
Legal Servs., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, Civil No. 87-1264, slip op. at 6
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 1988) (ordering the disclosure of the names and addresses of
illegal aliens to a legal services group for the purpose of informing them of a citi-
zenship registration requirement); National Ass'n of Atomic Veterans, Inc. v. Director,
Defense Nuclear Agency, 583 F. Supp. 1483, 1487-88 (D.D.C. 1984) (ordering the
disclosure of the names and addresses of veterans involved in atomic testing due to
the public interest in informing the veterans of benefits and health testing).
156. Brief Amici Curiae of American Newspaper Publishers Association; Gannet
Co., Inc.; Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; American Society of News-
paper Editors; Society of Professional Journalists; National Association of Broadcasters;
Newsletter Association; and the New York Times Co. at 18, United States Dep't of
State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991) (No. 90-747) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of News-
paper Publishers]. See, e.g., IBEW Local Union No. 5 v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 852 F.2d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988) (ordering the disclosure of
the names and addresses of nonunion employees where the asserted public interest
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use of information was considered and the public benefits of the sec-
ondary effects of that use outweighed the privacy interests at stake,
courts have often held that lists of names and addresses must be re-
leased pursuant to a FOIA request.
The Supreme Court refused to squarely address the issue of derivative
use." Nonetheless, the Court did consider the secondary effects of dis-
closure on the Haitian returnees and found an invasion of privacy suffi-
cient to justify withholding under Exemption 6. The Court did not,
however, consider the secondary effects of disclosure when weighing the
public interest." By failing to evaluate the public benefits gained from
the derivative use of the names of Haitian interviewees, while consider-
ing the effect of secondary use on the possible invasion of privacy, the
Court distorted the balancing between the public and private interests
involved. As a result, the Court's opinion fails to enforce Congress'
clear legislative intent toward heavily favoring disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act."
was in the prevention of unlawful competition for government construction contracts);
Heights Community Congress v. Veterans Admin., 732 F.2d 526, 530 (6th Cir.) (stat-
ing that the investigation of racial steering in real estate loans was a legitimate public
interest), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
The interest in nondiscriminatory proceedings is particularly relevant with re-
spect to Haitian migrants due to the widespread accusation of governmental racism in
determining the eligibility of these migrants for American asylum. See supra 21 (not-
ing allegations that the Haitian interdiction program is racist and discriminatory). See
also Lennox, supra note 69, at 714-23 (arguing that racial discrimination is the driv-
ing force behind the Haitian immigration policy of the United States); Little, supra
note 21, at 293 (noting that critics of the United States' Haitian immigration policy
have argued that the denial of asylum to most Haitian migrants is racist).
157. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550. See supra notes 102-10 (discussing the Supreme
Court's treatment of the derivative use issue).
158. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Supreme Court's basis for allowing the State Department to withhold the
names of Haitian returnees).
159. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550. See supra note 110 (discussing the Supreme Court's
refusal to apply "derivative use" considerations to the public interest side of FOIA
Exemption 6 balancing). Justice Scalia, in a concurrence, refused to consider second-
ary effects at all and found that the simple disclosure of the names was enough to
justify exemption. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 551. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying
text (discussing Justice Scalia's concurrence).
160. See supra note 15 (noting Congress' legislative intent in enacting the Free-
dom of Information Act).
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IV. DISTORTING THE BALANCE:
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF RAY
The Ray opinion represents a considerable degree of deference toward
the United States Government's interest in the non-disclosure of signifi-
cant information.'6' Nothing in the text or legislative history of the
Freedom of Information Act supports the contention that the public
interest in requested information must be in the disclosure itself and not
in any possible derivative use.'62 In fact, courts have considered sec-
ondary effects when balancing public and private interests under Exemp-
tion 6 of the FOIA.' Yet, the Supreme Court's inconsistent applica-
tion of derivative use considerations in Ray broadens the scope of the
Exemption 6 non-disclosure provision by considering the weight of
secondary effects only with respect to the privacy interest side of the
balance."' Such a skewed consideration of secondary effects heavily
favors the withholding, rather than the disclosure, of information held by
governmental agencies."6
In addition, the Court's creation of a "presumption of legitimacy"
concerning the veracity of government reports 6 has the potential to
further distort the balancing process mandated under FOIA Exemption 6.
The fundamental purpose of the Freedom of Information Act is to "open
161. Arthur C. Helton, Justices Seem to Give INS the Benefit of the Doubt, NAT'L
L.J., April 20, 1992, at 38. In fact, a number of recent decisions reflect the Supreme
Court's deference to governmental interests regarding the claims of refugees and
aliens, and a corresponding diminution of those claims. Id. See INS v. Doherty, 112
S. Ct. 719, 727 (1992) (holding that an asylum applicant can waive refugee protec-
tion); INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816-17 (1992) (narrowing the ability of
refugees to gain asylum by strictly construing the requirement of a "well-founded fear
of persecution").
162. Amicus Brief of Newspaper Publishers, supra note 156, at 16. See 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1988) (text of the Freedom of Information Act); SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.,
SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 93D CONG., 2D SaSS.,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES,
ARTICLES (Comm. Print 1974) (reprinting the legislative history of the FOIA).
163. See supra notes 155-56 (noting cases that have considered the secondary ef-
fects of disclosure as part of Exemption 6 balancing).
164. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (discussing the opinion of the
Supreme Court).
165. See supra note 15 (explaining that the FOIA was enacted to foster full agen-
cy disclosure of information).
166. Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 550. See supra note 110 (discussing the Supreme Court's
presumption as to the veracity of the agency reports at issue in Ray).
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agency action to the light of public scrutiny.""'6 Presuming the legiti-
macy of governmental action is a step toward defeating that purpose.
The FOIA Exemption 6 balancing test was designed to allow the United
States Government to protect personal privacy, as long as that protection
was not at the expense of public interests.' By suggesting that the
public does not have an interest in testing the veracity of the
Government's reports, the Ray Court has dramatically reduced the
weight that can be applied to the public interest side of Exemption 6
balancing. This will likely have the effect of permitting the Government
to withhold information that, considering the history and purpose of the
FOIA,' should be subject to disclosure.
CONCLUSION
The United States Government's policy of interdicting Haitian nation-
als at sea and forcibly returning them to Haiti has generated significant
controversy." The public has a number of legitimate interests in the
Haitian interdiction program, which include an interest the safe return of
Haitian migrants and in the validity of the United States Government's
justification for their interdiction and forced repatriation.' The Free-
dom of Information Act was passed to allow "any person" the ability to
scrutinize American governmental conduct," - subject to a few well-
delineated and narrowly defined exemptions." In United States De-
partment of State v. Ray,74 the Supreme Court defeated a FOIA re-
quest using a distorted application of Exemption 6.'" By failing to
167. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
168. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent that,
under FOIA Exemption 6, courts balance an individual's right to privacy against the
public's right to governmental information).
169. See supra notes 15, 22. 146 (describing the history and function of the Free-
dom of Information Act).
170. See supra note 21 (noting widespread public controversy concerning the Hai-
tian interdiction program).
171. See supra notes 142-50 (discussing the public interest in the interdiction
program).
172. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988). See supra note 8 (noting that the phrase "any
person" includes foreign citizens and aliens).
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988). See supra note 74 (describing the FOIA
disclosure exemptions).
174. 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
175. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ray).
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consistently weigh the secondary effects of disclosure, 76 and by pre-
suming the legitimacy of governmental reports," the Court narrowed
the scope of the Freedom of Information Act where privacy concerns
can be implicated. Specifically, the Court allowed minimal and spec-
ulative privacy interests' to outweigh the substantial public interest""
in disclosing the names of Haitian interviewees. As a result, the public
lacks the ability to monitor the United States' attempt to comply with
its obligation, under international law, to prevent the refoulement of
Haitian migrants seeking asylum in America."w
176. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's treatment of the derivative use issue).
177. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of
the Supreme Court's assertion that government records are presumed to be legitimate).
178. See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy inter-
ests of the Haitian returnees).
179. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (discussing the public interest
in the information sought in Ray).
180. See supra note 57 (noting that the United States is prohibited by international
law from forcibly returning aliens to a country where they will face persecution).
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